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Control Mechanisms of MNEs: An Empirical Study 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: This paper seeks to explore variations in the extent of control mechanisms, according to 
country of origin and organizational characteristics, in a challenging country of domicile. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: A survey research design involving the use of a questionnaire as the 
primary data source was adopted. A total of 350 subsidiaries were initially randomly selected and 
contacted in person, or via telephone and e-mail, of which 147 agreed to take part in the study and 
responded to the survey. 
 
Findings: we find that MNEs from highly financialized Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) will be 
associated with a greater reliance on formalized control mechanisms; this will enable the MNE’s 
headquarters to closely monitor subsidiary managers according to objective measures, in order to 
ensure that the maximum shareholder value is released. 
 
Research limitations/implications: Our study reveals a greater reliance on control mechanisms in 
larger firms, reflecting a desire to maximise bureaucratic economies of scale. 
 
Practical implications: We find that the presence of expatriates regardless of country of origin leads to 
greater decentralization, suggesting foreign firms do not trust local staff 
 
Originality/value: this is one of few studies of this nature conducted for the region of Middle East – 
and the only one we are aware of for Saudi Arabia. Further, it sheds new light on the impact of 
contextual circumstances on how closely firms monitor their subsidiaries, the challenges of doing 
business in the Gulf region, and the consequences of the large scale usage of expatriates. 
 
Keywords: Control mechanism, Headquarter–Subsidiary relations, Multinational Enterprises, Agency 
theory, Saudi Arabia, Ordinal regressions. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
How do companies change their internal control mechanisms in response to challenging  
external circumstances and firm level responses? This is a study of centralization and control 
within MNEs operating in Saudi Arabia, one of the last absolute monarchies on earth, which 
remains a highly challenging environment in which to do business due to  insecurity  over 
investor rights, opaque regulations, and the capture of entire arms of government by princely 
entrepreneurs (Ross 2011; Bradley 2011). Despite this, the country still holds an attraction for 
foreign investors, given its oil and gas riches and its status as the global swing producer. 
Traditionally, theories of strategies of control have revolved around the views of control as 
including output, behavioural, and normative controls; however, prior research  in the  area  of 
IB indicates that the contextual factors of the MNE  subsidiary,  encompassing  not  only  
country of  domicile,  but also issues  such as  size,  nationality of  parent company,  presence of 
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expatriate managers, and subsidiary function, all impact the relative  balance  of  the 
management control systems, as well as the degree of autonomy available to the subsidiary 
(Birkinshaw, Hood & Jonsson 1998, Colakoglu & Caligiuri 2008, Johnston & Menguc 2007, 
Fang, Jiang, Makino, & Beamish 2010, Anderson & Holm 2010). This paper seeks to explore 
variations in the extent of control mechanisms, according to country of  origin  and 
organizational characteristics, in a challenging country of domicile.  The  remainder  of  the 
paper is organised as follows: the next section outlines the context and relevant  prior  
theoretical and applied enquiry; hypotheses are developed in the subsequent section; data 
collection, variables, and methodology are then explained, followed by the analysis of results; 
finally, discussion occupies the last  section. 
 
 
The Saudi Context: Regulation and  Volatility 
 
Although Saudi Arabia ranks quite highly in the Word Bank ‘Doing Business’ index (in part,      
a product of perceived labour market flexibility and the near complete lack of worker rights     
for a large portion of the workforce), the environment for investors is a challenging one, inter 
alia, on account of the difficulties of litigation in Saudi courts (see Zegars 2006), and societal 
dynamics (Rice 2004). In practice, it has proven difficult to enact the necessary reforms  to  
make the environment more hospitable for foreign investors  (Hertog 2011).  Indeed,  it has  
been argued that Saudi Arabia represents an extreme example of the rentier state (Lawson  
2011), and suffers from a particularly chronic resource curse (Auty 2001). Although in 2014 
Saudi Arabia had a GDP per capita of $18,000, placing the country in the middle to upper 
income category, this is considerably lower than a high of some $22,000 in 1977, despite high 
oil prices in the 2000s (Trading Economics 2015). Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 1, 
below,  this growth  has been highly volatile, making it  difficult for  organizations to plan for  
the future with confidence, even in the oil and gas  industry. 
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Figure 1: Changes in the Saudi GDP Per  Capita 
 
Source: Trading Economics (2015). 
 
 
 
Even when compared to other resource rich countries, Saudi Arabia has been remarkably 
unsuccessful in building a developmental state (Auty 2001; Lawson 2011;  Beblawi 2007).  
Auty (2001) argues that this reflects Saudi Arabia’s role as the key swing producer, and a   
deeply embedded political culture centring on authoritarian paternalism. This has led to 
considerable inequality, with between two and four million out of 16 million native Saudis  
living in poverty, with high levels of unemployment among the young (Guardian 2013). 
Meanwhile, a high proportion of oil and gas rents are captured by possibly as many as 15,000 
princes (Economist 2014), with the Saudi monarch being one of the richest  despots in the  
world. Hertog (2011) argues that key arms of government constitute little more than personal 
fiefdoms of dominant figures in the regime. Rising fears of instability – and despite a highly 
repressive environment and political protests – have led to the government accelerating its 
indigenization policy in order to create more job opportunities for local nationals. Currently,    
the country has some 12 million migrant workers, making the majority  of  those  in  
employment foreign (Guardian 2013; Jehanzib et al. 2013). These foreign workers comprise a 
small minority of highly skilled expatriates, and a large grouping  of  unskilled  and  semi- 
skilled workers. The latter are not readily substitutable  with indigenous Saudis,  not only (in  
the case of semi-skilled and skilled occupations) because of a chronic lack of skills, but also 
because many Saudi firms have founded their competitiveness on a system of quasi peonage, 
with foreign labourers facing police brutality, confiscation of their passports, and arbitrary 
expulsion as instruments of labour coercion. Hence, although the Saudization policy has been   
in place for some two decades, it has made only limited inroads in reducing the country’s 
reliance on foreign labour; indigenous Saudis are in a position to insist on better wages and 
working conditions (Niblock and Malik  2007). 
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Ross (2001) argues that in common with other resource rich autocracies, there are three main 
mechanisms that shore up the status quo. Firstly, there is the rentier effect, the ability to buy-   
off key interest groups, in the Saudi case, key fundamentalist religious  interests. Secondly,   
there is the repression effect, the ability to purchase large numbers of weapons  and  
technologies for mass surveillance (ibid.). Thirdly, there is the modernization effect, with 
revenue inflows reducing pressures for cultural or economic modernization. Indeed,  Ross  
(2011) suggests: “No state with serious oil wealth has ever transformed into a democracy. Oil 
lets dictators buy off citizens, keep their finances secret, and spend wildly on   arms”. 
 
It could be argued that the revenues have increased the range of institutional options, resulting  
in much variety, from relatively efficient arms of state to corrupt personal  fiefdoms  and  
“armies of bureaucratic clients” (Hertog 2011). Moreover, the Saudi state has accumulated  
large scale financial obligations to different interest groupings that are difficult to reverse, 
authoritarianism notwithstanding. On  the one  hand, this entrenches  state dominance,  yet on  
the other hand, makes the state less coherent (Hertog 2011). Princes serve as intermediaries 
between commercial interests and the state, allowing  innumerable  opportunities  for  
corruption, and the blurring of personal royal wealth and state resources (Wilson   1994). 
 
Within Saudi Arabia, there is a localization policy in place, Saudization, which  aims  to  
promote the employment of local people through a quota system (Sadi and Al-Buraey 2009).  
An initial 2003 goal was to ensure that 30% of employees in firms employing 20 or more 
workers were Saudi nationals, but this was watered down in 2006 (Tripp and North 2011). 
Nonetheless, many firms either chose to close or to nominally employ Saudis as window 
dressing.   In 2011, the Nitaqat system was introduced, a carrot and stick approach that makes    
it easier for firms that meet Saudization targets in order to obtain visas for foreign workers;  
firms that are red-lined for a lack of progress in Saudization are no longer permitted to renew   
the visas of their expatriate  staff. 
 
Saudization has led to increased job opportunities for Saudi nationals, but chronic skills 
shortfalls have meant that firms have to employ under-skilled locals (Al Dosary and Rahman 
2005). The official General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training 
(GOTEVT) is both overly bureaucratic and ineffective (see Al-Shamaari 2009), whilst the 
overwhelming majority of Saudis with tertiary education hold degrees  in religious  studies,  
with only 20% of graduates holding technical or job relevant qualifications (Tripp and North 
2011).  Again,  it  means  that  Saudis  with  technical  qualifications  are  in  very  short supply, 
  
 
 
 
leading to serious problems with staff retention, as highly skilled individuals regularly job-    
hop (Al-Subhi Al-Harbi 1997; c.f. Torofodar 2011). In turn, this has led to the continued 
employment of large numbers of  expatriates. 
 
In such a challenging environment, MNEs are pulled in different directions. On the one hand, 
they are under great pressure to employ and advance Saudi nationals, especially those with  
close links to the princely elite. The difficulties of operating in Saudi Arabia mean that  
managers who have experience in dealing with local circumstances are particularly valuable  
(see Tripp and North 2009). MNEs may have an interest in delegating as much as possible to 
them, given that they are better able to navigate local vicissitudes. On the other hand,  local 
skills shortfalls and the need to ensure that staff follow the interests of  the organization,  and  
not some princely patron or other, may drive tighter control from the   centre. 
 
 
Forms and Practice of Control: Existing  Evidence 
 
Agency theorists have proposed that principals tend to use three primary types of control – 
cultural, behavioural and output – to varying degrees (Ouchi 1985). Behaviour control means 
that control is achieved by monitoring the behaviours of others, whilst output control involves 
measuring the desired quality and quantity of output. Cultural control, however, involves 
socialising the agent to consider his or her interests as co-identical to those of the principal; 
however, these are indirectly related in that the use of one method of control may affect the 
efficacy of another (Chang & Taylor 1999). Past research has also  noted  the  relative  
popularity of output control (Egelhoff 1984) and staffing control – that is, using parent 
expatriates to fill management positions (Baliga & Jaegar 1984). These can be viewed as 
manifestations of cultural control as they are intended to create a greater sharing of values and 
goals between the HQ management and the  subsidiary. 
 
Given  this, we investigate formal structures of control, as well as how such forces affect –  
either directly or indirectly – different  methods adopted for control and coordination, as well   
as the requirement for such. With the aforementioned taken into consideration, this research 
provides a framework model that makes the proposition that a number of different subsidiary 
features, such as the size  and country of origin, are able to affect  the mechanisms of control  
and the degree to which they are applied by headquarters over their subsidiaries located in  
Saudi Arabia. 
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Statement of Hypotheses 
 
Home and Host Country  Effect 
 
A large body of literature  suggests that it is not only country of domicile (host), but also  
country of origin (home), that impacts on firm level practice (Brewster et al. 2008); the latter 
reflects variations in shareholder rights, and the extent to which they may be diluted by the 
rights of other stakeholders. The literature on comparative capitalism has developed a number  
of country taxonomies that encompass the countries of origin encountered  in  this  study.  
Firstly, there is the US and the UK, held up as quintessential or highly financialized Liberal 
Market Economies (LMEs), where shareholder rights are most advanced, enabling the latter     
to most closely direct the policies and practices of the firm (Hall  and  Soskice  2001).  
Secondly, although the literature has tended to see this category as an internally coherent one 
(Lane and Wood 2012), recent writers such as Konzelmann et al. (2012) have pointed to the 
existence of a second category of less financialized LMEs, including Canada, Australia and  
New Zealand. The dominance of the financial sector in the first category means that there are 
even stronger pressures to short term shareholder value. Thirdly, there are the continental 
European capitalist (coordinated markets) or “Rhineland” economies, including Germany, 
Sweden and the Netherlands (Amable 2013). Fourthly, there are the Scandinavian social 
democracies, distinguished from their peer coordinated markets by stronger social, but weaker 
employment, protection and less centralized financial systems (Amable 2013).   Fifthly, there    
is Japan. While Japan is another example of a coordinated market economy (CME) and has  
much in common with the two preceding countries, it also has important differences in that  
large corporations play a particularly important role  in  providing  stability  in  collaboration 
with the state, and state welfare and bargaining institutions are less developed (ibid.). Sixthly, 
there is South Korea, which, whilst sharing many features with Japan, has very distinct 
institutional directions given the developmental role of the state during the years  of  
authoritarian rule, and which we treat here as a distinct category (see  Whitley  1999).  
Seventhly, China is often depicted as having a variety of capitalism in its own right, 
characterized by a much higher degree  of  state direction  than  in mature market economies,  
but also by much internal diversity (Boyer 2012). Finally, the Middle Eastern economies have 
been held to have common features on account of a combination of rapid but volatile growth 
that has taken place largely despite, rather than on  account  of,  institutional  frameworks  
(Kuran 2004). 
  
 
 
 
There is a body of applied work that links country of origin with control.  An early pioneer of  
the literature on comparative capitalism, Lincoln (with colleagues) found that the difference 
between formal and de facto centralisation was very minor in American companies but rather 
more considerable in Japanese companies (Lincoln et al. 1986).Jain & Tucker (1995) assert   
that power is more centralised in Japanese companies than in American companies in general. 
Zaheer (1995) found that Japanese banks show higher levels of centralisation than American 
banks, although the difference was not statistically significant.  Again,  Kustin  and  Jones  
(1996) found that the influence of Japanese headquarters on their American subsidiaries was 
greater than the influence of American headquarters on American subsidiaries. More recent 
work has sought to distinguish between formal and informal systems of control (Kim, Park& 
Prescott 2003). It has been argued that formal control mechanisms dominate in US MNEs 
(O’Donnell 2004) and implicit control mechanisms in Japanese ones (Taylor 1999). A related 
issue is that Japanese MNEs have a relatively high presence  of  parent country expatriates in 
their subsidiaries (Kopp 1994), associated with the formation of ‘mini-headquarters’ in the 
foreign subsidiary, enhancing cultural control (Baliga & Jaegar  1984).  Similarly,  Ferner  
(1997) found Japanese MNEs were likely  to make greater usage of social control, supported   
by a relatively high usage of expatriates, whilst US MNEs favoured formal control (see also 
Hulbert & Brandt 2000; Birnberg & Snodgrass  1988). 
 
Negandhi (1987) found that that 88% of the subsidiaries of American MNEs sampled heavily 
relied on written policies from headquarters, a much larger amount than those from Asian and 
European coordinated markets: only 32% of the subsidiaries of German and 12% of the 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms. Similar distinctions we reencountered between US and 
Continental European (coordinated market) MNEs (Wolf 1994),  between US and Japanese  
ones (Jaeger and Baliga 1985), and between US and French ones (Calori  et  al.  1994).  
Research evidence in the areas of attention seeking (Bouquet & Birkinshaw 2008) and 
formalisation (not investigated in this paper) are less abundant. There is similar  broad  
consensus around output control. In an early study, Scholhammer (1971) found that American 
MNEs  relied more heavily on  reports than European firms. Confirming this picture, Hulbert    
& Brandt (2000) found that US MNEs required higher levels  of  reports  than  either  
Continental European or Japanese MNEs (for similar results, see Negandhi 1987;1984;    1988). 
 
Given that Britain is also a highly financialized LME, characterized by a high degree of 
financialization and activist investors (Konzelmann et al. 2012), it could be argued that there 
would  be  similarly  high  pressures  for formalization  in  order to  ensure  that a  value  release 
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agenda is adhered to. Formal controls by HQ could include, among others, the degree of 
standardisation the HQ may require from its subsidiary and the kind of rules and procedures  
that it may exert towards its subsidiary. Hence, we hypothesize   that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Formal control in MNEs from highly financialized LMEs will be higher than    
that from other capitalist  archetypes. 
 
 
 
Domestic and Third Country  Staff 
 
Given gaps in local skills and capabilities, and quite rapid  turnover  of  indigenous  highly 
skilled staff (Al-Subhi Al-Harbi 1997; c.f. Torofodar 2011), firms that employ large numbers    
of domestic managers may seek to centralize decision making as  much as possible. There   
could be two reasons for this. The first would be that, given high levels of poaching, domestic 
managers may soon work for competitors, and hence, may face conflict of interest dilemmas. 
Secondly, as a result of problems associated with “window dressing”, under-skilled or under 
experienced locals may be employed in highly visible positions in order to meet Saudization 
targets and/or to win the goodwill of some royal or other, but may not be trusted with real 
autonomy or vested with meaningful control. This leads to hypothesis   2: 
 
Hypothesis 2: MNEs employing high numbers of domestic staff are more likely to be  
centralized. 
 
Edstrom & Galbraith (1977) analysed the international transfer of managers in four  
multinational companies, one of which transferred a far greater number of managers than its 
direct competitor – despite their being of the same size, operating in the same industry, and 
having almost identical organisational charts. Further, Edstrom & Galbraith hypothesised that,  
in that multinational, the transfer of managers was used to socialise managers and  create 
informal verbal international information networks. Others (Ferner, Edwards & Sisson 1995; 
Welch, Fenwick & DeCieri 1994) tested this hypothesis, and found that the  usage  of  
expatriates  was viewed as a way for individuals to build up networks  of contacts and absorb  
the international ethos and practices of the firm.   In other words, the  usage of large  numbers   
of expatriates may be associated with a higher degree of   decentralization: 
 
Hypothesis 3:   MNEs employing high numbers of third country expatriates are less likely to     
be centralized. 
  
 
 
Size of the Parent and  Subsidiary 
 
According to Baliga & Jaeger (1984), as well as Snell (1992), the size of the subsidiary is  
linked with the design of the control mechanisms. However,  two  competing  mechanisms  
could be  at play here.  On  the one hand, the increased size of a subsidiary could mean that it  
can build up its own resources and become independent from the HQ; conversely, a very large 
subsidiary may be particularly important to the HQ as a profit centre, and may require more 
control than usual. And the only way to do this may be by a variety of formal, centralised, or 
bureaucratic controls (see section below on details of these types of  controls),  ultimately 
leading to more overall controls. We, therefore, hypothesize   that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Size of subsidiary is positively related to the extent of controls. The larger the  
size of the parent and subsidiary,    the greater the degree of control exercised by the parent. 
 
 
 
Methods 
 
Data and Measurement 
 
A survey research design involving the use of a questionnaire as the primary data source was 
adopted. The survey instrument went through  several  iterations and  was fine-tuned after a  
pilot study. In the main survey, data were collected from MNEs’ subsidiaries in three major 
cities, namely Riyadh, Jeddah and Jubail. The subsidiaries studied were from the Directory of 
Foreign Companies in Saudi Arabia, published by the Saudi Arabia Investment Authority 
(SAGIA). Additional sources, such as business associations and government agencies,  were  
also contacted to cross check and update the information in some instances. A total of 350 
subsidiaries were initially randomly selected and contacted in person, or via telephone and e- 
mail, of which 147 agreed to take part in the study and responded  to  the  survey  (42%  
response rate). Preliminary and statistical tests (see below section on analysis) show that the  
data collected satisfies reliability criterion and that factor  loadings,  average  variances  
extracted (AVE), and reliability tests provide  sufficient  confirmation  of  the  convergent 
validity for the variables. 
 
The survey instrument had five sections: section one was directed towards obtaining  
information on control variables, including the size of the parent  and  subsidiary,  its  age, 
sector, and the nationality of the manager. Subsequent sections were directed towards eliciting 
information on the  role of expatriates, the HQ–subsidiary relationship, performance,    structure 
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and knowledge flows. Control mechanisms were measured with the help of 11 Likert-scale 
questions (5 being the highest) on the four categories and formed the basis for dependent 
variables (see below for details). Some Replies to  survey  questionnaires  were  delayed.  
Follow up calls to the subsidiaries revealed that the delay occurred as a number of managers 
were being consulted before the questionnaire was finally filled in. Subsequent checks on the 
data revealed that data are consistent and  reliable. 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Four categories of dependent variables signifying level and  variety of  controls  were created 
(see Table 1). ‘Centralised’ Controls (CC), which includes replies to the following areas of 
interest: 1. the level of autonomy in the subsidiary to decide its own strategies; 2. the degree     
of surveillance that headquarters' managers execute towards this subsidiary; 3. the degree to 
which the HQ uses expatriates to directly control the subsidiary’s  operations.  ‘Formal’  
Controls (FC), which includes replies to the following areas of interest: 1. the degree of 
standardisation that the headquarters requires from the subsidiary; 2. the kind of rules and 
procedures that the HQ exerts towards the subsidiary. ‘Output’ Controls (OC), which includes 
replies to the following areas of interest: 1. the degree of output control that the headquarters 
exerts towards the subsidiary; 2. the type of planning/goal setting/ budgeting that the 
headquarters uses towards the subsidiary. And finally ‘informal controls’ (IF), which includes 
replies to the following areas of interest: 1. the degree of participation by the subsidiary’s 
executives in committees/taskforces/project groups; 2.to what extent do the executives in the 
subsidiary share the company’s values; 3.the degree of participation of the subsidiary's 
executives in training programs; 4. the level of informal communication  between  the  
subsidiary and the headquarters and other subsidiaries. All variables are measured on a five- 
point Likert scale, ranging 1–5, with 5 signifying the highest level of   control. 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables consist of the size, firm, and country related factors. This study 
employs 25 independent variables: 1 is the (log of) subsidiary employment; 2 is (log of) 
employees worldwide; 3 is the (log of) number of expatriates in subsidiary; 4 is the age of the 
subsidiary; 5–9 are industry dummies(petroleum, chemicals, electronics & electrical, motor 
vehicles, food & beverages); 10–17 comprise group parent nationality dummies: 10 Germany 
 j j 
 
 
 
 
and Switzerland, 11 Netherlands (continental  European  capitalist  economies),  12  Australia 
and Canada (softer liberal market economies), 13 Denmark and Sweden (social democracies), 
14 Japan (coordinated market economy), 15 Italy, 16 South Korea, 17  China,  Lebanon,  
Kuwait, Egypt and Jordan (Middle Eastern emerging economies)  –  the  omitted  dummy  
(group 0) is the US and the UK (which were correlated); variables 18 and19 represent the 
nationality of the subsidiary (Saudi or third country); 20 and 21 represent the ownership status  
of the subsidiary (majority-owned or joint venture); 22–25 represent the subsidiary function – 
(22 marketing and sales, 23 manufacturing, 24 assembly, 25 services); 26–29 represent the    
four types of control exercised (26 ‘centralized’ controls, 27 ‘formal’ controls, 28 ‘Output’ 
controls; 29 ‘informal’  controls). 
 
 
Statistical Procedure 
 
The statistical analysis is carried out with the help of factor analysis, mean, sd, zero-order 
correlations and ordinal regression analysis. The ordinal regression used to analyse part of the 
data may be written in the form as follows if the logit link is applied: f [gj (X)] = log { gj (X) /  
[1- gj  (X)]}= log {[ P(Y ≤ yj  | X)] / [P(Y >yj  | X)]}= aj  + ßX, j = 1, 2, …, k - 1, and gj  (x) = e  (a 
+ ß X)  / [ 1 + e (a    + ß X)  ], where j indexes the cut-off points for all categories (k) of the   outcome 
variable. If multiple explanatory variables are applied to the ordinal regression model, BX is 
replaced by the linear combination of ß1X1 + ß2X2 +… + ßpXp. The function f [gj  (X)] is  
referred to as the link function that connects the systematic components (i.e. aj + ßX) of the 
linear model. The alpha a j represents a separate intercept or threshold for each cumulative 
probability.  The threshold (a j) and the regression coefficient (ß) are unknown parameters to     
be estimated through means of the maximum likelihood method (Chen & Hughes    2004). 
 
 
Results 
 
Reliability and Validity of  Variables 
 
Before the statistical work began the data  were subjected to convergent validity (CV) which  
can be tested in the form of three indicators: factor loadings,  average  variance  extracted 
(AVE), and reliability of the variables and their measuring items  (Hair  et  al.  2010).  The 
results in our case show that the factor loadings of each variable indicator are significant (in 
comparison to  sample  size),  ranging  from  0.55  to  0.90,  demonstrating  a  strong association 
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between variables and their factors. Further, the results indicate that AVE  values are higher  
than the required threshold value of 0.50, demonstrating adequate convergence  of  the  
variables. Finally, the results of the Cronbach’s alpha test indicate that the scales satisfy the 
reliability criterion, with values ranging from 0.66 to 0.76. Taken together, as recorded in    
Table 1, the results of factor loadings, AVE, and reliability tests  provide  sufficient  
confirmation of the convergent validity for the variables listed in the table  below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Results 
 
Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviations and zero order  correlations  of  variables.  
Selected highlights of the table are as follows. Centralised controls are  positively associated 
with the overall size of the firm, motor vehicles industry, majority subsidiary holdings, but 
negatively associated with subsidiaries that are performing marketing and sales functions. 
Formalised controls do not seem to be favourable and, notably, are negatively associated with 
the overall size of the firm and motor vehicles industry and with joint  venture  forms  of 
business operations. Output controls are positively associated with CME parents and with 
majority-owned services firms where the nationality of the manager is Saudi Arabian. Finally, 
informal controls are positively associated with services industry, size of the firm and number  
of expats in the subsidiary, chemicals industry, and in firms where managers are from a third 
country. Informal controls are negatively associated with the joint venture form of    operations. 
 
 
 
 Table 2 Basic statistics and correlations 
 
 
M 
 
Sd 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
24 25 
 
26 
 
27 
 
28 
 
29 
1 7.21 1.04 1 
                            
2 10.17 1.03 .31** 1 
                           
3 4.33 1.33 .83** .24** 1 
                          
4 .41 .49 -.34**
*
 -023** - 
.25** 
1 
                         
5 .20 .40 .06 026** .06 -.05 1 
                        
6 .56 .50 -.03 -.16 -.02 .06 - 
.57** 
1 
                       
7 .37 .48 -.22** -.23** - 
.21* 
-.07 - 
.39** 
.31** 1 
                      
8 .37 .49 -.05 -.12 -.02 .12 .45** - 
.33** 
- 
.59** 
1 
                     
9 .06 .24 .04 .28** .06 -.16 -.13 .23** - 
.19* 
- 
.19* 
1 
                    
10 .10 .30 .11 .08 .12 .13 -.11 -.06 - 
.26** 
- 
.26** 
-.09 1 
                   
11 .34 .48 .16 .32** .15 -.05 .35** -.14 - 
.28** 
.36** - 
.18* 
.23** 1 
                  
12 .27 .44 -.28** -.50** - 
.25** 
-.04 - 
.30** 
.13 .50** - 
.18* 
-.15 - 
.20* 
- 
.43** 
1 
                 
13 .16 .37 -.22** .04 - 
.19* 
.04 - 
.22** 
.09 .19* .04 -.11 -.15 - 
.32** 
.11 1 
                
14 .35 .48 .18* .07 .11 - 
.27** 
.16* -.09 -.14 .38** .11 - 
.24** 
.32** - 
.17* 
- 
.32** 
1 
               
15 .16 .36 .04 -.02 .08 .13 .06 -.07 -.13 -.14 .20* .16* -.11 -.04 - 
.19* 
- 
.31** 
1 
              
16 .06 .24 -.12 -.03 -.15 -.10 -.13 .05 .33** - 
.19* 
-.06 -.09 - 
.18* 
.42** -.11 - 
.18* 
-.11 1 
             
17 .15 .36 -.14 -.14 -.10 .23** .12 -.12 -.16 -.01 -.10 .17* .18* - 
.25** 
- 
.18* 
- 
.31** 
- 
.18* 
-.10 1 
            
18 .14 .34 -.09 .40** -.08 .15 -.01 -.08 -.09 - 
.31** 
-.10 .52** .13 - 
.23** 
.09 - 
.28** 
.10 -.10 .11 1 
           
19 .13 .34 .00 -.16 .02 - 
.20* 
- 
.19* 
.14 .25** - 
.29** 
.32** -.06 - 
.28** 
.18* - 
.17* 
.27** .11 -.09 -.10 -.15 1 
          
20 .08 .27 -.14 -.35** -.12 .01 -.15 .16* .18* -.02 -.07 -.10 - 
.21** 
.49** .13 -.01 -.13 .34** -.12 -.11 -.11 1 
         
21 .07 .25 -.13 -.14 -.07 .21* -.14 .02 - 
.21* 
.34*** -.07 -.09 - 
.19* 
- 
.16* 
.24** .09 -.12 -.07 -.11 -.10 -.10 -.08 1 
        
22 .04 .20 .18* .04 .18* .24** -.10 .04 -.09 .19* -.05 -.07 .29** -.12 -.09 .21* -.08 -.05 .01 -.08 -.08 -.06 -.05 1 
       
23 .05 .23 .22** .17* .21* -.02 -.12 .21** - 
.18* 
- 
.18* 
.44** -.08 - 
.17* 
-.14 -.10 - 
.17* 
.55** -.06 -.10 -.09 -.09 -.07 -.06 -.04 1 
      
24 .07 .25 -.13 -.06 -.10 .04 .19* -.09 .07 .07 -.06 -.09 - 
.19* 
- 
.16* 
.25*** - 
.20* 
.25*** -.07 -.11 -.11 -.10 -.08 -.07 -.05 -.06 1 
     
25 .16 .36 -.26**
*
 -.35** - 
.18* 
.36** -.03 .08 .09 -.02 -.11 .10 .12 .08 - 
.19* 
- 
.31** 
- 
.18* 
-.11 .60** - 
.17* 
- 
.16* 
-.13 -.12 -.09 -.10 -.12 1 
    
26 3.22 .99 .04 .43** .02 -.14 .30** -.01 - 
.21** 
.08 .16* -.15 -.08 -.10 .05 .08 - 
.23** 
.19* -.08 .14 - 
.18* 
.17* .08 - 
.19* 
.18* .07 - 
.26** 
1 
   
27 4.11 .74 -.06 -.17* -.02 .11 .14 - 
.26** 
-.14 .12 -.03 .10 - 
.17* 
.14 .04 -.01 .14 - 
.21* 
.15 -.05 .11 .09 .24** .13 -.12 .14 -.09 .11 1 
  
28 4.19 .69 .17* .19* .17* .12 .30** - 
.21* 
-.09 .08 - 
.36** 
.23** .26** -.13 -.14 -.02 .15 .01 .09 .10 - 
.16* 
.06 .12 .22** -.07 .22** -.13 .33** .59** 1 
 
29 4.02 .65 .21** .18* .17* .01 .35** - 
.32** 
- 
.44** 
.17* -.07 .25** -.09 -.03 -.14 - 
.17* 
.26** -.12 .09 .14 -.03 - 
.16* 
.09 - 
.18* 
.08 .14 -.08 .33** .45** .49** 1 
1=log subsidiary employment; 2=log employees worldwide; 3=log expatriates in subsidiary; 4=age of subsidiary; 5-9 are respective industries: petroleum, chemicals, electronics & 
 electrical, motor vehicles, food & beverages; 10-17 are nationality of the parent: 10= Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, 11= Australia, Canada, 12= Denmark, Sweden, 13=Japan, 
 14=Italy, 15=South Korea, 16=China, 17=Lebanon, Kuwait, Egypt, and Jordan; 18,19 represent the nationality of the HR director; 20-21 represent subsidiary type-majority owned or joint 
 venture; 22-25 represent subsidiary function—22 marketing & sales, 23 manufacturing, 24 assembly, 25 services. No. 26-29 represent the type of control exercised. 
 
Multinational Business Review 
 
Multivariate Analysis of  Results 
 
Table 3 provides the results of ordinal multivariate regression analysis on  four  control  variables 
and 25 independent variables as described above. Table 3 provides the results of the hypotheses, 
as well as additional results discussed  separately. 
 
 
 
The first hypothesis states that formal control in MNEs  from  highly  financialized  LMEs will be 
higher than in those MNEs from other capitalist archetypes.  Table 3 reports the results of   the 
regression analysis on eight groups of country dummies, four of which are domiciled in Europe: 
Group 10 (Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands), Group  11  (Australia,  Canada),  Group 12 
(Denmark, Sweden) and Group 13 (Italy). The US and the UK, the two highly financialized 
countries, were used as control group. The results for this hypothesis are  revealing. The 
‘centralised’ controls coefficient for all of these groups of countries are significant but negative. 
For the ‘formal’ method of controls, the results are negative and significant only in the case of 
Italian parents. For groups of countries 10, 11, and 12 the coefficient, though positive, is not 
significant. With regard to ‘output’ controls, the coefficient   is significant but negative in the case 
of group 11 and 12 countries; it is positive but not significant in the case of group 10 countries. 
Finally for ‘informal’ means of control, the coefficient is significant but negative in the case of all 
the groups except Italy, in whose case   the coefficient is positive but not significant. Extending 
the results for Asian capitalist economies, we  notice that Japanese parents have a significantly 
negative attitude to all forms   of controls except control by ‘formal’ mechanisms, the coefficient 
for which is  not  only positive but highly significant, contrary to what is suggested by earlier 
work (see Lincoln,  1986). The results for South Korean parents are similar to those of Japanese 
parents except    that the coefficient for control by ‘formal’ means, though positive, is not 
significant. Chinese parents display a negative approach to all forms of control mechanisms.  
Middle  Eastern  market economy parent firms rely heavily on ‘bureaucratic’ means of controls, 
the coefficient for which is not only positive but highly significant. The latter might reflect an 
Ottoman bureaucratic tradition, which continues to exert a long term influence regarding formal 
regulation and organizational procedures (Findley 1980; Heper and Berkman 2009). Overall,   the 
results support the test for the first hypothesis. Compared to the control  group  of  the  highly 
financialized group of countries (the US and the UK), the results for the rest of LME group of 
countries display a negative approach to controlling their subsidiaries by the four methods of 
controls analysed. For hypothesis 1, therefore, we get mixed   results. 
 
The second hypothesis states that MNE subsidiaries employing large numbers of domestic 
managerial staff are more likely to be centralized.  Results show that this seems to be the case,  as 
out of four types of controls, the  coefficients of two genres of controls – ‘formal’ (BFC)    and 
‘informal’ (CS&N) turn out to be positive and significant. This is a highly illuminating  result  as   
  
it  signifies  several  essential  points.  First  a  Saudi  manager  entrenched  in     local customs 
and values is best placed to deal with his/her subordinate staff when it comes to interfacing 
formally. At the same time there will be many demands stemming from the  operation of the 
extended  informal clan and clientalist networks of support, and in order to    take account of local 
restrictions on working hours (e.g. during hours of prayer). An instance would be meeting certain 
deadlines, which might require the use of overtime or working on holidays. A manager embedded 
in the local culture and speaking  local  dialects  is  ideally placed to deal with such situations and 
get the job done. It should also be noted here that in all likelihood most non-managerial staff 
employed in subsidiaries will also be locally sourced, in which case junior Saudi managers are 
best placed to deal with them. The results thus largely support the second  hypothesis. 
 
The  third hypothesis states that ‘MNEs employing high numbers of third country expatriates   
are less likely to  be centralized’. We indeed find that the presence of third country managers  
has a negative influence on all types of controls; in other words their presence leads to a 
reduction in the quantum of control exercised by the HQ over its subsidiary. Given that 
expatriate working and living in Saudi Arabia has a general reputation for being extremely 
challenging (Bradley 2015),  MNEs may battle  to entice  suitably qualified Western nationals  
to take on assignments. In turn, this means that MNEs may make extensive usage of skilled 
managers from developing nations, who are more likely to be enticed by favourable pay rates 
(c.f. Mellahi and Wood 2001). However, developing country expatriates face particular 
challenges, which can range from petty discrimination to a greater likelihood of arbitrary 
expulsion (Bradley 2015; Mellahi and Wood 2011; c.f. Buhaini et al. 1996), and are likely to    
be particularly vulnerable to Saudization drives. Hence, whilst it may facilitate the 
decentralization of decision making for the reasons outlined above, it also brings with it real 
risks. The results thus prove the third  hypothesis. 
 
The  fourth hypothesis states  that  the size of the subsidiary will positively relate to the extent   
of controls. The larger the size of the parent and subsidiary, the greater the degree of control 
exercised by the parent. Table 3 reports the results regarding the numbers employed in the 
subsidiary and its impact on four categories of controls. The results indicate that this seems to   
be the case as the coefficient is not only positive on account  of all four control types but is    
also significant in the case of control by ‘output’ and ‘informal’ means. The results also show 
that the size of the parent has a significant positive influence too on all four categories of 
controls; the larger the size of the parent the greater the control exerted on its subsidiaries by   
all four means. The results thus support the fourth   hypothesis. 
  
 
 
Additional Results 
 
In addition to the results related to the testing of our hypotheses, Table 3 also reports further 
results in terms of ‘ownership’, ‘age (number of years operating in Saudi)’ and sector. The results 
show that majority-owned subsidiaries negatively influence all types  of  control;  it seems that 
majority-owned subsidiaries have more delegated authority than is the case with other forms of 
ownership. For joint ventures none of the control mechanisms from HQ are shown to be 
significant. This could be owing to the simple fact that in joint operations duties  and 
responsibilities may be equally shared. The age of the subsidiary (i.e. whether it has been 
established relatively recently or further in the past) does not seem to have any bearing on control 
mechanisms. Subsidiaries engaged in marketing and sales positively influence ‘centralised’ 
controls; the manufacturing sector views negatively ‘informal’ means of control.  In assembly 
line businesses reliance seems to be more on controls by way of ‘output’ and ‘informal’ means. 
Assembly line businesses also negatively view control by ‘centralised’ methods. This makes 
sense as output, i.e. units assembled per worker or per shift, are easily counted, especially when 
the compensation is linked to output. Finally, in the service industry centralised controls 
predominate. This is explainable by the fact that policy and  directives  in  the services sector are 
largely centrally formulated and also monitored by   HQ. 
 
        
 
 
 
  
 
Discussion 
 
This study explores the relationship between country of origin, indigenization and control 
mechanisms exerted by of MNEs over their subsidiaries. Whilst some of the findings confirm     a 
wide base of existing knowledge, inter alia, encompassing the reliance on more  formal methods 
of control in larger firms, we also find evidence of a proclivity of MNEs from highly 
financialized LMEs for greater control, possibly in order to more  directly  appease  the  demands 
of activist shareholders.  In contrast, the existing literature suggests that the latter is   the case for  
  
US MNEs, the study confirms that this is also so for British ones, highlighting the common 
ground between the two highly financialized LMEs. This is very different behaviour   to those of 
MNEs from other LMEs, which have more in common  with  their CME  peers.  And, whilst 
there are strong government pressures to employ and advance Saudi nationals, existing 
research highlights the slow progress this may have  made  (Sadi  and  Al-Buraey  2009). What 
this study adds is that when firms do employ significant numbers of Saudi nationals, they appear 
not to be trusted: in such instances, the head office exerts tighter and  more formal control. With 
regard to size, it seems that larger the organization, the higher the degree of control, probably 
because more is at stake. More specifically,  output  controls  become progressively important as 
firms increase in size. At the same time, the level of autonomy and informal communication 
between the HQ and fellow subsidiaries decreases;     this reflects the extent to which larger firms 
rely on more formalized and bureaucratic mechanisms of control, which, at the same time, allow 
for economies of scale (Brewster et al. 2007). 
 
Firms can also exercise controls by means of non-measurable cultural bindings, commonly 
referred to as control by informal and social means (Ferner 1997). This may be attained by 
locating a sizeable number of managers from home within the subsidiary. However, we find  that 
it is the usage of expatriates per se, rather than simply parent country nationals, that leads  to 
greater autonomy. In other words, this difference cannot  be  explained  by  the  usage  of social 
or informal control mechanisms, as the expatriate managers did not originate from the same 
nation or cultural background. What appears to be the case is that firms simply trust host country 
nationals less. There are two possible explanations for this. The first is  that,  subsidiaries may 
primarily hire locals to meet Saudization requirements. Chronic shortfalls in technical training 
and a bias of tertiary education towards fundamentalist religious subjects, means that there is a 
shortage of suitably qualified locals, with firms responding through resorting to “window 
dressing”, whilst making sure that important decisions are left to head office. A reliance on 
formal control mechanisms makes it easier to manage the aspirations of Saudi managers, creates 
an impression of equity between domestic and expatriate managers     (as all are subject to the 
same rules and procedures), and reduces the chance of accusations of favouritism or 
discrimination. It may also reflect deeply embedded cultural stereotypes – and prejudices – 
widely held by outsiders in dealing with the Middle East, a reflection of specific colonial legacies 
and strategies developed towards the exploitation of the region’s natural resources (see Said 
2003); this may make for a mutually reinforcing cycle of mistrust, necessitating, but also 
worsened by, low levels of local   autonomy. 
 
Taggart and Hood (1999) suggest that higher autonomy in MNE  subsidiaries  makes  for  greater 
innovative capabilities. However, our study reveals that in the manufacturing and high technology 
sectors, direct control is greater. The former might simply reflect the present state 
 
  
of Saudi manufacturing, geared towards  standardized goods,  manufactured through the  usage of 
Taylorist methods.  However, the latter might, again, indicate, a lack of trust, and the desire  to 
protect proprietary knowledge (Buckley and Casson  1976;  Richards 2000).  We  also find that 
controls are significantly less in majority-owned subsidiaries. MNEs which have been operating 
longer in the country are less likely to make usage of direct controls, probably indicative of a 
greater experience in navigating local waters, the operation of  informal  networks, and a more 
nuanced awareness of the signifiers of trustworthiness in local partners  and staff. 
 
 
Research Contributions, Limitations,  and Extensions 
 
The relationship between HQ and subsidiaries, and the degree of autonomy accorded to the  latter 
is a very mature area of research. However, this is one of few studies of this nature conducted for 
the region of Middle East – and the only one we are aware of for Saudi Arabia 
– and sheds new light on the impact of contextual circumstances  on  how  closely  firms  monitor 
their subsidiaries. Our empirical work not only replicates earlier studies, retesting propositions 
encountered in the existing literature, but also sheds new light on the challenges    of doing 
business in the Gulf region, and the consequences of the large scale usage of expatriates. . 
 
The methodology adopted can be extended to  other host countries. A useful extension would   be  
to link  different control  mechanisms with the  perceived and actual financial performance  of 
subsidiaries. They can also be linked with the objectives and strategies of subsidiaries vis- à-vis 
HQ. In a multi-country study of this nature, it can be researched if inter-country  differences exist 
between the control mechanisms of subsidiaries of the same parent operating  in different host 
countries. Such a study would also account for the limitations of one-country studies, and shed 
further light on what really defines individual national settings. 
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